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31 Introduction to the project1
This case study describes how the Japanese firm NEC uses software technology and information
systems to achieve competitive advantage. It is part of a broader project entitled Software as a
Tool of Competitive Advantage, which is supported by a three-year research grant from the
Alfred P. Sloan Foundation. The project employs the case study method to examine and compare
how U.S. and Japanese firms who are recognized leaders in using software and information
technology have organized and managed this process.2 While each case is complete in itself, it is
part of this larger study.3
This semiconductor industry case study together with other cases advance the hypothesis
that leading software users in the U.S. and Japan are very sophisticated in the ways they integrate
software into their management strategies. Their software strategy works to institutionalize
organizational strengths, capturing tacit knowledge on an iterative basis.4 In the past, Japanese
firms’ software strategy relied heavily on customized and semi-customized software (Rapp,
1995b). However, this is changing towards a more selective use of package software managed
via customized systems. In turn, U.S. firms who have often relied more on packaged software,
are adapting more customized programs, especially for systems needed to integrate software
                                         
1 The co-principal investigator and I would like to thank the Sloan Semiconductor Industry Center at Berkeley for
their invaluable assistance, Madeleine Sorapure, and the participants at the Association of Japanese Business Studies
conference in Chicago for useful comments. They would like to thank especially Mr. Yoichi Numata, Vice President
of NEC, Mr. Akihiko Morino, Chief Engineer of the Semiconductor Group of NEC, and Mr. Yoshitada Fujinami,
Senior Manager of NEC for their time and insights. Any opinions, findings, or conclusions expressed in this paper
are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of NEC. Support from the Alfred P. Sloan
Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.
2 The industries and firms that are examined in this study are: food retailing (Ito-Yokado and H. Butts);
semiconductors (NEC and AMD); pharmaceuticals (Takeda and Merck); retail banking (Sanwa and Citibank);
investment banking (Nomura and Credit Suisse First Boston); life insurance (Meiji and USAA); autos (Toyota);
steel (mini-mills and integrated mills, Nippon Steel, Tokyo Steel and Nucor); and apparel retailing (WalMart).
3 Research on Advanced Micro Devices (AMD) as the counterpart case to NEC is underway.
4packages into something more closely linked with their business strategies, markets, and
organizational structure. Thus, coming from different directions, there appears some
convergence in the approach these leading software users are adapting. Furthermore, the cases
confirm the hypothesis that a coherent business strategy is a necessary condition for a successful
information technology strategy (Wold and Shriver 1993).5 These strategic links for NEC are
presented in the following case.
This along with the other case studies also illustrates that the implementation and design
of each company’s software strategy depends in the competitive environment, industry and
strategic objectives. These factors influence how firms choose between packaged and customized
software options for achieving specific goals and how they measure their success. Indeed, as part
of their strategic integration, the firms studied have linked their software strategies with their
overall management goals through clear mission statements that explicitly note the importance of
information technology to the success of the firm.
In addition, NEC has introduced an active CIO (Chief Information Officer) and IT
(information technology) support group participation in the decision making structure making
the totally independent MIS department a thing of the past. This may be one reason why
outsourcing has not been a real option for them, even though their successful business
performance is not based solely on software. Rather, as shall be described below, software is an
integral element of their overall management strategy and plays a key role in serving corporate
goals such as enhancing productivity, improving inventory management or strengthening
customer relations.
                                                                                                                              
4 Summary results for the completed cases can be found in William V. Rapp, “Gaining and Sustaining Long-term
Advantage Through Information Technology: The Emergence of Controlled Production,” Working Paper, Center on
Japanese Economy and Business, Columbia University, December 1998.
5 Ibid.
5In NEC’s case information systems complement and integrate the firm’s manufacturing,
R&D, and marketing approaches, reflecting the company’s clear understanding of their business,
their industry and the firm’s competitive strengths. This clear business vision has enabled NEC
to select, develop and use the software they require for each business function. Since this vision
impacts other corporate decisions, they have good human resource and financial characteristics
too.
A common theme that NEC shares with other leading software users is the creation of
large proprietary interactive databases. These databases promote automatic feedback between
various stages and/or players in the production, delivery and consumption process. Also common
to other leading software users is NEC’s ability to use IT to reduce inventories and improve
control of the production process. This is done by building beneficial feedback cycles or loops
that increase productivity in areas as different as R&D, design, production, test and marketing,
while reducing cycle times and defects by integrating production and delivery. Reduced cycle
times decreases costs and increases the reliability of forecasts due to the shorter time period.
Customer satisfaction and lower inventories are improved through better on-time delivery. Thus,
information systems is a critical factor in the leading software users’ overall business strategies,
with strong positive implications for doing it successfully, and potentially negative implications
for competitors.
One important consideration in this respect is the possible emergence of a new strategic
manufacturing paradigm, “controlled production,” in which NEC appears to be a leading
participant. In the same way mass production dramatically improved on craft production through
the economies of large scale, plants that produced and used standardized parts and lean
production improved on mass production due to a continuous manufacturing line, reduced
6inventories and better demand forecasts. What we call “controlled production” seems to
significantly improve productivity through monitoring, controlling and linking every aspect of
manufacturing and distribution of a product or service, including after-sales service and repair.
Such controlled production is only possible by actively using information technology and
software systems, to continuously monitor and supervise functions that had previously formed a
rather automatic system response to changes in demand. This may be why industry analysts
consider information technology that is integrated operationally and organizationally as an
important factor to business success. Therefore, at NEC the software and systems development
people are part of the decision making structure within the semiconductor division, while the
system itself is an integral part of the way they organize, deliver, and support the semiconductor
business, from R&D to sales forecasting and market intelligence. This sequence is particularly
critical in the integrated circuits market, where there are large and rapid swings in the demand
and supply for particular products.
Therefore, Seagate Technology may be correct for NEC too when they state in their 1997
Annual Report:
We are experiencing a new industrial revolution, one more powerful than
any before it. In this emerging digital world of the Third Millennium, the
new currency will be information. How we harness it will mean the
difference between success and failure, between having competitive
advantage and being an also-ran.
In NEC’s case, as with the other leading software users examined, the key to using
software successfully is to develop a mix of packaged and customized software that supports
their business strategies and differentiates them from competitors. However, with the exception
of using English as their common language within the division, they have not tried to adapt their
organizational structure to the software used. Furthermore, they perceive that functional and
7market gains have justified the additional expense incurred in customizing certain systems,
including the related costs of integrating customized and packaged software into a single
information system for the division. They do this by assessing the possible business uses of
software organizationally and operationally, and especially its role in enhancing their core
competencies or particular functions. While NEC will employ systems used by competitors if
there is no business advantage to developing their own, they reject the view that information
systems are generic products best developed by outside vendors, who can achieve low cost
through economies of scale and investments in the latest technology.6
In undertaking this and the other case studies, the project team sought to answer certain
key questions while still recognizing firm, country and industry differences.  These have been
explained in the summary paper Gaining and Sustaining Long-term Advantage Through
Information Technology: The Emergence of Controlled Production, a Center on Japanese
Economy and Business working paper by William V. Rapp. An outline of the questions can be
                                         
6 NEC and the other cases have been developed using a common methodology that examines cross-national pairs of
firms in key industries. In principle, each pair of case studies focuses on a Japanese and American firm in an
industry where software is a significant and successful input into competitive performance. The firms examined are
recognized by the Sloan Industry Centers and considered within their industry as ones using software successfully.
To develop the studies, we combined existing research results with questionnaires and direct interviews. Further, to
relate these materials to previous work as well as the expertise located in each Industry Center, we held working
meetings with each Center and coupled new questionnaires with the materials used in the previous study to either
update or obtain a questionnaire similar to the one used in the 1993-95 research (Rapp 1995b). This method enabled
us to relate each candidate and industry to earlier results. We also worked with the Centers to develop a set of
questions that specifically relate to a firm’s business strategy and software’s role within that. Some questions
address issues that appear relatively general across industries such as inventory control. Others such as managing the
IC manufacturing process are more specific to a particular industry. The focus has been to establish the firm’s
perception of its industry and its competitive position as well as its advantage in developing and using a software
strategy. The team also contacted customers, competitors, and industry analysts to determine whether competitive
benefits or impacts perceived by the firm were recognized outside the organization. These sources provided
additional data on measures of competitiveness as well as industry strategies and structure. The case studies are thus
based on extensive interviews by the project team on software’s use and integration into management strategies to
improve competitiveness in specific industries, augmenting existing data on industry dynamics, firm organizational
structure and management strategy collected from the Sloan industry enters. In addition, we gathered data from
outside sources and firms or organizations with which we worked in the earlier project. Finally, the US and Japanese
companies in each industry were selected on the basis of being perceived as successfully using software in a key role
in their competitive strategies. In fact, these companies perceive their use of software in exactly the same manner.
The competitive benefits were generally confirmed after further research.
8found in Appendix B, where NEC’s profile is presented based on our interviews and other
research. Readers who wish to assess for themselves the way NEC’s strategies and approaches to
using information technology address these issues may wish to review this prior to reading the
case. For others it may be a useful summary.7
                                         
7 The questions are distinguished into the following categories: General Management and Corporate Strategy,
Industry Related Issues, Competition, Country Related Issues, IT Strategy, IT Operations, Human Resources and
Organization, Various Metrics such as Inventory Control, Cycle Times and Cost Reduction, and finally some
Conclusions and Results. They cover a range of issues from direct use of software to achieve competitive advantage,
to corporate strategy, to criteria for selecting software, to industry economics, to measures of success, to
organizational integration, to beneficial loops, to training and institutional dynamics, and finally to inter-industry
comparisons.
92 Introduction to the case study
The invention of the transistor in the late 1940s and the subsequent design of the integrated
circuit revolutionized the storage and processing of information, affecting all aspects of
economic activity. While mature industries, such as the vacuum tube seemed to disappear, new
industries emerged including the semiconductor, computer, and software industries. The latter
was established from efforts to organize, design, and produce programs that could maintain and
process information. Even though software has been a critical factor in production processes,
precisely how firms design and implement their software strategies, measure their performance,
and choose among different software options is less clear. Nor is it readily apparent how firms
integrate these strategies with their management objectives. This study attempts to better
understand these issues by addressing the role and impact of software as a tool to create
competitive advantage in the semiconductor industry.
One important outcome of an earlier study (Rapp, 1995b) was that U.S. software users
rely more on less expensive packaged software, whereas Japanese consumers tend to use more
customized or semi-customized software. The above study finds that approximately 85% of the
large organizations’ software expenditures in Japan are for customized software. In terms of
designing and producing advanced, customized, or packaged software, however, the Japanese
industry is not as developed. Thus, the reliance on customized software is costly not only for the
software-users, but for the Japanese developers and producers of software as well.
This result questions the rationality of the Japanese firms, since an outcome involving
customized or semi-customized software seems not to be cost minimizing. Researchers argued
that this (seemingly) non-rational strategy resulted in technologically backward information
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systems, inefficient management, and a fragmented Japanese software industry. Conversely,
others argued that if software is used to capture organizational strength and tacit knowledge, the
customized software strategy may be rational and economically efficient (Rapp, 1995a). The
present case study attempts to address this issue by closely examining the semiconductor
division of NEC, a market characterized by global competition, dynamic economies of scale, and
rapid technological change.
The case begins by placing the Japanese semiconductor industry in global context and
examining the governmental policies and subsequent growth of the domestic and international
semiconductor markets. As Japan's leading semiconductor producer, NEC's evolution and
current business strategies are an integral part of this development. At the same time, the study of
NEC's organizational structure and product choice allows an understanding of the company's use
of and demand for software. The case study concludes by examining the use of information
technology as a tool to create competitive advantage. The last section summarizes the findings.
However, to appreciate the role of information technology within NEC's Semiconductor
Group, some important characteristics of the market have to be outlined.
3 Semiconductor industry: an overview
The semiconductor industry is considered the vehicle of the “information revolution” or “second
industrial revolution.” Observers have labeled it “strategic” for two reasons: the importance of
semiconductors as an intermediate good for high technology products; and the empirically-
documented presence of dynamic economies of scale through learning-by-doing and knowledge
spillovers.
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This section provides an overview of the semiconductor products and the manufacturing
process. The latter, one of the most complex production processes in industrial history,
determines some important economic characteristics. Historically, descriptions of substances
with properties similar to today’s semiconductor materials have existed since the early nineteenth
century. However, the understanding and utilization of their technological importance is a mid-
twentieth century phenomenon (Braun and Macdonald, 1982, chapter 2; Morris, 1990, chapter
3).
3.1 Product Description
Semiconductor materials are active electronic elements that can be either conductors or
insulators (non-conductors).8 In a conductor, the structure of the electrons facilitates the flow of
electricity, while in an insulator it impedes the flow of electricity. At low temperature
semiconductors are poor conductors but the degree of their conductivity changes depending on
temperature, impurity, and optical excitation.
3.1.1 Classification
Semiconductors can be classified by the material, power capability, function, design, and
technology employed. Yet another classification is based on the product type, resulting in two
main categories: discrete devices, and integrated circuits (ICs).9 Discrete devices consist of
                                         
8 Electronic components are usually classified as active and passive. Active components such as semiconductors
modify an electronic signal, and perform the amplification, modulation, generation, and switching operations.
Passive components such as capacitors, resistors, inductors, and relays, store or impede the flow of electricity. See
Meindl (1977).
9 Note that this general classification is by no means universally accepted. For instance, the International Trade
Commission introduces hybrid devices as a third category. Hybrids are special packaging compositions of single or
multiple integrated circuits with discrete components. In 1990 hybrids represented 6.3% of the world semiconductor
market (USITC, 1993, p. 1). Alternatively, the OECD introduces optoelectronics as a third category. Optoelectronics
are devices that emit or respond to light. In 1988 optoelectronics represented about 4% of the world semiconductor
market (OECD, 1992, p. 135).
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transistors, diodes, and special devices. They are single components of electrical circuitry, which
perform the rectification (diodes), amplification (transistors), and switching (transistors)
functions. Conversely, integrated circuits incorporate active and passive elements on a single
semiconductor substrate.
Increases in the number of components that an integrated circuit incorporates reflect
technical progress for the industry. In the mid-1960s, Gordon Moore, then at Fairchild, noticed
that the number of components per circuit had been doubling every year and predicted that this
trend would continue. This observation came to be known as Moore's Law, and holds even today
with a slight modification: transistors on a circuit double every eighteen months (Noyce, 1977, p.
65; Hutcheson and Hutcheson, 1996, p. 54). Generally, devices containing up to 100,000
components are considered very-large-scale-integration (VLSI) while those containing more than
a million components are considered ultra-large-scale-integration (ULSI).10 Recently this
amazing evolution of integrated circuit technology has resulted in chips that contain a whole
system, the “system-on-silicon.” Integrated Circuit Engineering estimates that since 1970 the
integration capabilities have increased by 35% to 50% per year (ICE, 1993, p. 5-26).
ICs are further divided into linear, or analog and digital. Linear or analog ICs are used to
process electronic signals in an analog mode. They are considered mature products and they are
used extensively in television and radio equipment. Digital ICs, in contrast, are used to process
electronic signals in a digital fashion. They operate as on/off switches that, depending on the
input, store and process information by utilizing a binary system. They are used in virtually all
the microelectronics industry, from aerospace technology to consumer electronic equipment. Of
                                         
 10 Devices containing up to 100 components are considered small-scale-integration (SSI), while those involving 100
to 1,000 components are considered medium-scale-integration (MSI). By the early 1970s the industry had moved to
large-scale-integration (LSI) where ICs included 1,000 to 100,000 components. See Veendrick (1992), figure 0.1,
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a total $63 billion worldwide semiconductor market in 1990, the market for analog ICs was $11
billion, while for digital ICs it was $37 billion (USITC, 1993, Figure 2, p. 3).
Digital ICs are further divided into logic devices, memory devices, and microprocessors.
Logic devices perform logical operations on data, and memory devic s store and retrieve
information. Finally, microprocessors combine the functions of the logic and memory devices
and perform the operation of the central processing unit (CPU) of a computer.
The largest part of the semiconductor market is memory devices, or simply memories. In
1990, they accounted for an estimated 28% of the IC market and 20% of the total semiconductor
market; these figures represented an estimated market value of $13 billion (USITC 1993, Figure
2, p. 3). Historically the Japanese semiconductor industry focused on producing memories.
Given their importance to the case, the following is a brief outline of their characteristics.
3.1.2 Memory devices
Memories are measured in binary units (bits) of information stored and are characterized by their
storage capacity, reliability, and cost per bit.11 In addition, some time-related dimensions are
very important, such as access time (i.e., speed of operation), cycle time, and data transfer time.
Memories are classified as volatile, where all the information stored is lost in the absence
of power, and non-volatile, where information stored is retained even in the absence of power.
Another way to categorize memories is based on their ability to store (“write”) and retrieve
(“read”), resulting in three groups: read-only memory, serial memory, and random-access
memory.
                                                                                                                              
and Gruber (1994), p. 145. For a different classification range see Braun and Macdonald (1982), p. 103, Levin
(1982), p. 45, OECD (1985), p. 9, and Howell et al. (1988), p. 26.
11 For an outline of the types and characteristics of memories see Hodges (1977), and Veendrick (1992), chapter 7.
14
Read-only-memories (ROM) contain data that cannot be altered. This type of non-volatile
memory can be found in pocket calculators. To alter the information, one needs to replace the
storage capacitor of the device. Other non-volatile memory types are the programmable-read-
only-memory (PROM) that is used in the computer keyboard, the erasable-PROM (EPROM) and
the electrically erasable PROM (EEPROM). In both EPROMs and EEPROMs the information
stored can be deleted with ultraviolet light and electrical means respectively, and the devices can
be reprogrammed.
Serial memory is a volatile type where the information is accessed in the same sequence
it was stored. It is used mainly in video applications. Finally, random-access-memory (RAM) is
a volatile type where the information stored can be altered. RAMs are used extensively in the
computer industry. They can access any storage location at the same time, as opposed to serial-
access or block-access memories. They are organized in rectangular arrays of rows and columns.
An intersection of a row and column forms a cell in which one bit of information is stored.
RAMs are divided into static (SRAM) and dynamic (DRAM). SRAMs are faster devices, that do
not need constant application of electric current to maintain their content. By contrast, DRAMs
erase all information stored if the power is turned off.
DRAM is the dominant memory product, accounting for 54% of the memory market in
1990. Worldwide consumption has increased from $13 million in 1971 to an estimated $7 billion
in 1990.12 The first commercially viable DRAM was the 1K, where K (kilo) represents 1,024 bits
of information. Introduced in 1970, it was followed by a new generation approximately every
three years with each new DRAM generation containing four times the capacity of its
predecessor. Since 1970 the following generations have been introduced in the market: 1K, 4K,
16K, 64K, 256K, 1M, 4M, 16M, 64M, and 256M, where M (mega) stands for 1,024K bits of
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information. Currently, devices with 1G, where G (giga) stands for 1,024M bits of information,
are being tested.
The semiconductor industry considers DRAMs a “commodity” product. They are
produced in great volume, with highly standardized features that allow the products of different
manufacturers to be close substitutes. DRAMs might differ in design and performance by
manufacturer, but all producers use the same speed classifications, package type, pins, and
technical qualifications. Therefore, DRAMs with similar specifications can be substituted in a
given use even when produced by different manufacturers.
3.2 Manufacturing
The manufacturing of semiconductor devices is considered the most complex mass production
procedure in the industrial history. It requires the coordination of highly skilled personnel trained
in engineering, physics, chemistry, metallurgy, and so on. The process consists of creating and
integrating microelectronic devices onto a wafer, a sliver of silicon cut from a single silicon
crystal, which has been grown in laboratories. The wafer is a smooth silicon disk, highly
polished on the one side with a diameter that has increased to eight inches nowadays, with plans
to expand further. Depending on the device’s complexity and size and the wafer’s diameter,
several hundred identical devices are contained in each silicon disk. These devices are also called
dice or simply chips. Yet, due to the large number of components per chip, the number of chips
per wafer has not risen despite the increase in the diameter of the wafer.
The manufacturing process has evolved in both scope and complexity during the last
twenty years, especially in the areas of substrate material, the number of transistors employed,
the minimum device size, the number of interconnections, and the materials used in the different
                                                                                                                              
12 The 1971 data is from Finan and Amundsen (1986), p. 307. The 1990 data is from USITC (1993), Figure 2, p. 3
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production stages.13 A stylized representation of a device's manufacturing process distinguishes
three stages: design, fabrication, and assembly and final testing (USITC 1993, p. 4).
3.2.1 Design
Because semiconductors have a complex three-dimensional structure, chip designers form a
detailed pattern of the device's multilayer structure, the layout, by using computer-aided design
(CAD) equipment. In this way, designers conceptualize new devices, select the processing
stages, and determine the size and location of the circuits. Finally, the layout is subjected to a
series of functional, electrical, and design-rule tests. This is the most costly and time-consuming
stage of the semiconductor manufacturing. The layout for the most complicated designs, such as
those for microprocessors, can take years to complete, while for the simpler static memories
design the layout can be completed in few months (Oldham, 1977; Yoffie 1987).
3.2.2 Fabrication
The second stage of the production process involves several steps. Initially, a plate called a
reticle or photomask, usually about ten times the final size of the device, depicts the completed
layout of each layer. The image of the reticle is then reduced through a series of sophisticated
lenses, and is projected through a mask onto a wafer. The wafer already has an insulating layer
of silicon dioxide and has been coated by a photosensitive material, the photoresist. This process
of tracing the circuit pattern onto a wafer is called masking, photolithography, or simply
lithography, and is considered the foundation of microelectronic technology (Oldham, 1977, p.
123). The lithography equipment, or stepper, follows a “step and repeat” process in which once
an area of a wafer has been exposed to the photolithography process, another area is positioned
                                         
13 See Oldham (1977), U.S. Department of Commerce (1979), Hazewindus and Tooker (1982), and Veendrick
(1992).
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under the beam electronically. This process depicts where impurities will be introduced and
where the connecting wires will be placed.14
Next, a series of chemical baths washes the photoresist from the light-exposed parts of
the silicon disk, thus transferring the circuit patterns onto the surface of the silicon disk. This is
called etching. Once access to the silicon has been established, dopants are introduced either by
diffusion or ion-implantation techniques to alter the electric properties of the substrate. Then
insulating material is introduced through a deposition stage and metal connections are placed
between transistors. Depending on the complexity of the device produced, these steps are
repeated several times.
After coating the wafer with a passivation, a scratch-protective layer, the final fabrication
stage consists of testing the wafer for defective chips. This probe-test involves highly
sophisticated equipment and computer programs to measure the output response of a circuit to
pre-determined stimuli. This completes the batch-manufacturing process.
3.2.3 Assembly and final testing
The wafer is then ready to be sawed or scribed to obtain individual chips. Dice that successfully
responded to the probe tests are packaged. Each die is attached to a supporting frame, and is
encapsulated into a plastic or ceramic package. A series of standardized quality and reliability
tests concludes the manufacturing process.
                                         
14 Industry participants and experts question the capability of the advanced optical lithography employed today for
the fabrication of the forthcoming gigabit-chip generation. See Oldham (1977), p. 123, and Veendrick (1992), p. 93-
96. For an outline of the debate concerning optical and x-ray lithography, see Stix (1995). See also Hutcheson and
Hutcheson (1996) for a discussion of the technological barriers in the fabrication process and the interaction
between economics and technology in the semiconductor industry.
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3.3 Economics of the industry
Several stylized facts that characterize the industry can be directly traced to the complex
semiconductor manufacturing process.
3.3.1 Demand side considerations
While the number of applications that require semiconductors is expanding rapidly, the computer
industry remains the main end-user, absorbing more that 51% of the total merchant market and
perhaps an even larger share of the captive market (See TABLE 1).
TABLE 1
Total merchant semiconductor market
1991 1991 1992 1992 1994 1994 1995 1995
bil US$ % bil US$ % bil US$ % bil US$ %
Computer 23.2 40.8 29 43 50.9 48.6 75.5 51.1
Consumer 15.2 26.8 17 25 20.4 19.5 25.9 17.5
Communications 7.6 13.4 9.1 13 15.5 14.8 21.8 14.7
Industrial 6.3 11.2 7.5 11 11.3 10.8 15.3 10.4
Automotive 3.1 5.5 3.4 5 5.2 4.9 7.7 5.2
Military 1.3 2.3 2 3 1.4 1.3 1.5 1
Total Semiconductor Market 56.8 100 68 100 104.6 100 147.7 100
Sources: Adapted from ICE (1997), figure 1-10, p. 1-10, except for 1992
which is adapted from ICE (1993), figure 1-13, p. 1-10.
TABLE 2 below reveals the cyclical nature of the industry, a fact that many analysts have
described in some detail. However, as devices become more specialized and the range of
semiconductor applications increases, the cycles become more product specific. Thus the
demand for semiconductors used in cellular telephones may be subject to different cycles than
for those used in automobiles. A factor that makes the industry cycles more intense, is the
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general practice of customers to place orders with more than one supplier in order to ensure
prompt and sufficient delivery of semiconductors.
TABLE 2
Annual growth rates of worldwide semiconductor
industry revenues, 1978-1992
Year 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Annual
growth rate
28.5 24.1 27.2 5.3 2.9 26.1 46.4 -16.8 23.9 23.7 38.6 7.3 1.6 8.1 9.6
Source: SIA 1993 Annual Databook, p.7
The immediate implication of the above is an increase inventories, which are then
subject to swings in demand due to both economic effects and technological obsolescence. Thus,
corporate success in this industry is closely related to two factors: accurate forecasting of
demand; and “flexible” manufacturing techniques that allow inventories to be managed.
3.3.2 Supply side considerations
Semiconductor manufacturers are generally divided into two groups, merchant and captive. A
merchant producer serves the open market. It generally operates a large open-market sales force
and well-organized open-market development programs.
Conversely, a captive producer is one that primarily or sometimes even exclusively
serves an internal or “in house” market. ICE (1993, p. 3-1) defines captive as the producer that
sells less than 25% of its production in the open market. Therefore, a captive producer does not
need a considerable open-market sales force, or an open-market device development program.
Interestingly, based on the Integrated Circuit Engineering definition, all captive firms are U.S.
based, such as IBM, GM-Hughes, Hewlett-Packard, and DEC. Although European, Japanese,
and Korean manufacturers transfer semiconductor devices internally, they sell more 25% in the
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open market. ICE estimated that in 1992 approximately 22% of the North American IC output
was captive (ICE, 1993, p. 3-2).
One reason foreign firms and smaller U.S. producers are not primarily captive is because
semiconductor production costs are very sensitive to improved yields from “learning-by-doing,”
and economies of scale. Thus, access to the global market is important in lowering costs.
A measure of great importance in the industry is the yield, that is, the percent of saleable
chips out of the total number of chips produced. Because of the complexity of the manufacturing
process, the yield for a new product is very low, sometimes less than 10%. The initial low yield
may be due to problems with the wafer, the circuit design, or the fabrication process.15 Through
readjustment, fine-tuning, and learning, a yield of 90% can be realized for mature products. The
ability to move quickly to this stage is a key component to business success for any
semiconductor firm. Therefore, modeling IC yield is very important in predicting the cost and
availability of a particular device. However, because the modeling is based on fundamental
parameters of an established technological process, the yield of future ICs is usually
underestimated. Nevertheless, yield modeling does not intend to predict the future; rather it aims
at improving the process and design of present generations.16
Cost declines can also be studied by the learning-by-doing model that estimates the
percentage that production costs decline for every doubling of cumulative volume produced.
Several researchers have tested this hypothesis for aggregate as well as disaggregate series of
                                         
15 For a detailed analysis see Bertram (1983). See also Veendrick (1992), p. 124-128, ICE (1993), section 3, and
Gruber (1994), appendix II.
16 For a description of different yield models see Bertram (1983), and Gruber (1994), appendix II. Although there
are a number of models in the literature, the most prevalent are the Poisson-, Murphy-, and Seed-yield models.
Frequently, a model is used for a specific device; for instance, Murphy's model is employed to estimate the yield for
memory devices. See ICE (1993), p. 3-14.
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semiconductor products, resulting in a range of outcomes.17 Still, given the complex production
process outlined above many firms concentrate their efforts on increasing yields in the
manufacturing of high-volume, standard products with simple design. The underlying reasoning
is twofold: first, when producing such chips it is easier to ascertain whether low yields are due to
a fault in the design or in fabrication; second, the skills learned from the high-volume product
may transfer to lower-volume products with more complex design and higher value added. The
high-volume devices are called technology drivers and are usually memory devices (DRAMs,
SRAMs, and EPROMs) due to their standard configurations.
TABLE 3
Historical worldwide wafer fab equipment,
semiconductor capital spending and production,








1983 2,121 5,666 21,537
1984 3,523 8,107 28,825
1985 3,357 7,299 28,132
1986 2,713 5,129 34,102
1987 3,137 6,435 41,833
1988 4,984 10,088 54,987
1989 6,011 12,464 59,184
1990 5,867 12,520 59,328
1991 6,014 12,995 64,453
1992 5,089 11,601 70,461
1993 6,876 14,150 87,662
1994 10,755 22,356 112,361
Source: Dataquest (June 1995)
Note: Thanks to Clark Fuhs of Dataquest for the data.
                                         
17 For instance see Webbink (1977), Howell et al., (1988), Gruber (1994), and Flamm (1996), and the references
cited there.
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The semiconductor industry is highly capital intensive (TABLE 3). Since 1986 the
average U.S. semiconductor firm was contributing between 13% and 15.6% of sales revenues to
capital expenditures, i.e., property, plan and equipment (SIA, 1993, p. 39). Further, the total cost
of a wafer fabrication facility has increased from 30 million dollars in the mid-1970s to 300
million dollars in the mid-1990's (Flamm, 1996, p. 16, table 1-2). The implication of these
increased capital expenditures is that entry to and exit from the industry has become
prohibitively expensive.
TABLE 4






1978 8 18.3 57.1 6.5
1979 7.1 17.8 55.7 6.5
1980 7.4 18.8 53.9 6.1
1981 9.6 21.0 57.1 7.8
1982 10.2 21.8 59.5 9.2
1983 9.9 19.2 55.6 8.4
1984 9.8 16.5 52.3 7.6
1985 14.4 21.1 59.9 13.4
1986 14.8 22.1 56.2 13.1
1987 12.9 20.2 23.9 10.6
1988 11.1 18.6 48.6 9.0
1989 12.3 19.1 51.8 10.1
1990 13.7 19.2 55.6 10.6
1991 13.8 18.9 53.6 11.3
1992 12.4 18.7 55.3 10.3
Sources: Column 2: SIA 1993 Annual Databook, p. 28,
Column 3: SIA 1993 Annual Databook, p. 27, Column
4: SIA 1993 Annual Databook, p 25, Column 5: SIA
1993 Annual Databook, p. 26.
Notes: 1 Selling, general and administrative costs
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Conversely, due to scale and learning economies, the variable cost in the industry is
decreasing over time. In addition, the basic inputs of production, transportation and distribution
costs are quite low (Tyson, 1993, p. 89). Further, firms try to reduce the expense of assembly and
final testing that tends to be labor intensive by moving them to low-labor cost areas. TABLE 4
provides information on different expenditures as a percent of sales. As already noted, technical
progress is a main characteristic of the industry, which makes investment in R&D a major
expense. TABLE 5 indicates that in 1986, R&D at 13% of sales is a higher percentage of sales
than in any other industry.
TABLE 5





















Sources: Business Week, June 22, 1987, adapted from Howell et al., 1988
Note: Business Week Data understates actual semiconductor R&D because
included in the denominator are sales of products other than semiconductors for multiproduct firms.
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4 NEC: a case study
In June 1997, in an elegant and fully equipped conference room at NEC's new Tokyo
headquarters, Vice President Yoichi Numata outlined the corporation's vision for the new
millennium: to become a leader in multimedia.18 In NEC's vision, this is the market where
supercomputers process information, where image is the main characteristic for the user, and
where the borders between hardware and software begin to fade. NEC enters its second century
of operations with a clear vision and, as will be shown, information technology is of strategic
importance to accomplish this objective.
Founded in the late ninetee th century, NEC is one of the most successful companies not
only in Japan but worldwide. Its major product groups are communications systems and
equipment, computers and industrial electronic systems, and electron devices. These three
categories comprise the Communications and Computer (C&C) operations, which in the last five
years represented 95% of its sales. NEC also produces home appliances, VCRs, TV sets, video
projectors, video games, and car electronic products. The share of sales by product category is
given in TABLE 6.
TABLE 6
Share of net sales by product category (in percentage terms)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Communications systems 27 27 27 27 28
Computers systems 52 51 50 47 44
Electron devices 16 17 18 21 24
C&C operations (total) 95 95 95 95 96
                                         
18 Personal interview, June 1997, Tokyo, Japan.
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Other operations 5 5 5 5 4
Source: Adapted from NEC (1996d)
In 1996 NEC was the fourth largest supplier in computers after IBM, Fujitsu, and
Hewlett-Packard; it was fourth in telecommunications after Alcatel, Lucent Technologies,
Erickson, and Motorola (NEC, 1996d). In addition, NEC was the second largest supplier of
semiconductors worldwide after Intel in 1995 and 1996 (TABLE 7). This is not surprising since
NEC established semiconductors as the basis for integrating communications and computer
systems. A strong semiconductor base allows NEC to achieve higher quality and lower cost in
computers and communication equipment. Leadership in the development and manufacturing of
semiconductors, therefore, is essential to NEC's corporate success. NEC’s impressive
performance is also evident in the selective financial data provided in TABLE 8.
TABLE 7
Worldwide top five merchant semiconductor sales leaders
1992 1995 1996 IC Sales ($M) %change 95-96
Intel 3 1 1 17,800 31
NEC 1 2 2 10,250 -16
Toshiba 2 3 3 8,725 -18
Hitachi 5 4 4 8,350 -15
Motorola 4 5 5 8,025 -7
Source: Adapted from ICE 1997
NEC has accomplished this leadership by diversifying into a wide range of products,
which allows the company not to depend exclusively on a single product (For a complete line up
of NEC semiconductor products see EXHIBIT 1 in the Appendix A). In the semiconductor
26
segment specifically, its ability to produce memory-devices, logic-devices, and microprocessors
distinguishes NEC from other competitors. For instance, the Korean firms Samsung and Hyundai
and the U.S. Micron Technologies focus on DRAMs, while Fujitsu targets cellular products.
Diversification also permits NEC to offer their customers a full product line. Thus, NEC supplies
even large customers in such a way that they have little incentive to move to other suppliers. This
provides a stabilizing effect against the industry's volatile demand.
The following section begins with a brief overview of the Japanese semiconductor
industry. It then examines NEC from two different perspectives: its historical evolution and its
organizational structure. The final part examines NEC's software and information systems
strategies that it uses to gain and sustain competitive advantage.
TABLE 8
NEC: Five-year historical financial statistics
(In millions of Yen)
Year ended March 31 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Net Sales  3,773,850  3,514,979  3,579,787  3,769,357  4,427,272
Cost of sales  2,520,783  2,394,247  2,463,607  2,557,536  2,980,718
R&D expenses  302,363  275,017  261,659  266,006  298,713
Selling, general, and administrative expenses  1,331,619  1,093,596  1,038,699  1,056,052  1,168,672
Capital expenditures  321,727  230,787  230,069  300,220  401,999
Depreciation  235,646  226,456  213,380  222,780  260,247
Operating income  121,448  27,136  77,481  155,769  247,802
Net income (loss)  15,276  (45,160)  6,606  35,316  77,166
Total Assets  4,081,217  3,978,899  4,039,809  4,151,320  4,683,120
Shareholders' equity  878,353  805,833  782,061  790,749  878,852
Shares outstanding1  1,539,143  1,539,417  1,540,169  1,541,322  1,546,193
Shareholders  147,482  161,838  168,115  164,218  160,139
Return on equity2 1.70% -5.40% 0.80% 4.50% 9.20%
Number of employees  128,320  104,969  147,910  151,069  152,719
Notes: 1 Thousand of shares
2 Return on equity = Net Income / Total Shareholder’s Equity
Sources: NEC, This is NEC 1996
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4.1 The Japanese semiconductor industry
Japanese electronics firms began the production of transistors in the mid-1950s and the
production of ICs in the mid-1960s. Two types of firms entered the production of
semiconductors: existing producers of vacuum tubes and new semiconductor manufacturers
(Tilton, 1971). However, the evolution of the Japanese semiconductor industry is quite different
than that of the U.S. industry, which focused primarily on the defense and military sectors. The
small domestic military and defense markets forced Japanese semiconductor firms to focus on
commercial applications. Consequently, foreign markets became very important outlets for
semiconductor products.
Japan has followed the progress of the U.S. semiconductor industry closely. At first,
Japanese firms imitated and reverse-engineered most of the U.S. industry's innovations. In the
1960s, Japanese firms focused their production on inexpensive, low-quality transistors for final
consumer products. However, by the end of the 1970s the industry moved towards state-of-the-
art production of semiconductor devices, mainly memories, for a variety of industries like
computer and telecommunications. Still, due to its initial small base of the industry, its growth
rate was exceptional. Over the 1970-84 period the average annual growth rate was 17% (Kimura,
1988, p. 37). Nevertheless, a point, which has been the subject of considerable policy analysis
and debate, is how this growth translated itself into the well-documented reversal between Japan
and the U.S. in worldwide semiconductor shipments. U.S. firms, which in 1975 held 75% of
worldwide semiconductor shipments, fell to 31% in 1992, while the Japanese and other Asian
producers increased their share from 20% to 50% for the same period (Flaherty, 1984; Krouse,
1992). In addition, as TABLE 9 indicates, U.S. semiconductor consumption also decreased during
this period.
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Many analysts attribute a large part of this rapid development, growth and shift in global
market share to the successful industrial policies of the Japanese government.19 In the 1950s, the
government supported the initial research on semiconductors that took place at Nippon
Telegraph and Telephone Corporation (NTT) and the Ministry of International Trade and
Industry (MITI) (Flamm, 1996, p. 40). In the 1960s the government established policies to
protect the domestic market. Indeed, until the mid-1970s the government controlled the inflow of
capital and technology, and it could place considerable pressure on Japanese producers and
customers by informal meetings at ministries as well as through trade associations. Even after the
removal of the formal entry barriers in the late 1970s, foreign firms found it difficult to break
long-standing, traditional relations between producers, users, and governmental agencies. At the
same time, however, the government wanted to build a globally strong Japanese semiconductor
industry. To do so, the government recognized the need for vigorous internal competition. Thus,
while protecting the domestic market from foreign entry, it fostered competition among the
Japanese firms.
In addition, analysts have outlined a series of factors that have contributed to the different
evolution of the industry in Japan and the U.S.20 These arguments focus on the vertical
integration and debt financing characteristics of the Japanese economy. Japanese firms have also
made a greater effort to automate the production process as opposed to searching out low labor-
cost areas for their assembly lines.21
                                         
19 Flamm (1996), Chapter 2, provides a detailed account of the government intervention and its effect on the
development of the Japanese semiconductor industry. See also Borrus et al., (1983), Howell et al., (1988),
Prestowitz (1988), and Tyson (1993) among others.
20 For instance see Webbink (1977), Morris (1990), and Tyson (1993), among others.
21 Morris (1990) points out that in 1973, the US had 128 offshore assembly plants whereas Japanese firms had only
four.
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Nevertheless, within the industry, leading producers follow different strategies with
respect to the number and type of devices they produce and the end-users they focus on. Thus,
Kimura (1988) cites several studies that identify groups of firms with distinct business strategies.
NEC, Hitachi, and Toshiba manufacture a full product line, whereas Fujitsu, Oki, and Sharp do
not. Furthermore, NEC, Fujitsu, and Oki emphasize devices used mostly on telecommunications
and computer industries, whereas Hitachi, Toshiba, and Mitsubishi support the general electric
and electronics equipment sectors.
TABLE 9














1982 44.37 28.17 21.13 6.34
1983 43.58 30.73 18.44 7.26
1984 44.44 30.65 18.01 6.90
1985 37.33 35.02 20.74 6.91
1986 31.85 39.63 20.00 8.52
1987 31.14 38.92 18.56 11.38
1988 29.74 40.30 17.89 12.07
1989 30.24 39.52 18.15 12.10
1990 28.51 38.81 19.01 13.66
1991 28.21 38.28 18.50 15.02
1992 30.72 32.39 19.20 17.70
Source: Adapted from SIA 1993 Annual Databook, p. 13, and author’s own calculations
4.2 The history of NEC
NEC was founded in 1899 as a joint venture with the Western Electric Company of the U.S., the
first Japanese joint venture with foreign capital.22 Initially, the acronym stood for Nippon
                                         
22 This section relies heavily on Kobayashi (1991), and NEC (1996a).
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Electric Company, Ltd., but it was renamed NEC Corporation in 1983. In 1925, Western Electric
sold its shares to International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT) of the US, which acquired almost
60% of NEC. ITT held its stake in NEC until the early 1960s after which NEC grew as an
independent entity. NEC also strengthened further its affiliation with the Sumitomo group, which
it had established in the 1930s.
NEC's original business objective was to import and manuf cture telecommunication
equipment. After World War II, it participated in Japan's rapid domestic expansion due to the
country's reconstruction. NEC entered the semiconductor market in 1958 by building a large-
scale transistor plant and capturing 15% of the domestic market the following year (Flamm,
1996, p.45). It also expanded in the home appliance market by establishing the New Nippon
Electric Company Ltd., presently NEC Home Electronics, Ltd. However, its main client was the
Japanese Communication Ministry in its different forms [(currently Ministry of Post and
Telecommunications (MPT)]. For instance, Nippon Telegraph and Telephone (NTT) was the
single most important client for NEC from NTT's formation in the early 1950's until its partial
privatization and reorganization in the mid 1980's, sometimes representing over 50% of NEC's
sales.
In the 1960s and 1970s, NEC expanded both by entering new international markets,
which included establishing worldwide subsidiaries, and by manufacturing new products. It
established a marketing subsidiary in the US (Nippon Electric New York, Inc.), and a
manufacturing subsidiary in Mexico (NEC de Mexico). Two new areas that held great interest
for NEC were computers and software. Thus, in the 1960s it formed an unsuccessful alliance
with Honeywell, hoping to support its diversification into computer equipment and software. In
addition, NEC formed alliances with Hitachi and Fujitsu to develop computers. However, since
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these computers were dependent on using more advanced semiconductors, NEC also became one
of the main forces behind the joint effort of the Japanese government and the private sector to
develop VLSI chips in the mid 1970s.23
A new period for NEC began with the articulation of the ''C&C'' (Compute and
Communicate) corporate strategy announced by its chairman, Koji Kobayashi, in 1977. This
innovative approach envisioned integrating computer and communication technologies through
semiconductors (Kobayashi, 1991). By implementing this strategy, NEC became one of the
leaders in the production of semiconductor devices in the following decade. It established
manufacturing units for semiconductors in Dallas, Texas and for VCRs, printers, and TV sets in
United Kingdom. In Japan, it enjoyed great success from the production of mainframe systems
and portable computers.
The 1990s began with a new location for the NEC headquarters in Tokyo, and an
operations expansion to other Far Eastern countries with a manufacturing joint venture for digital
electronic switching systems in China, and a coordination center in Singapore. In addition, the
1990s brought an expansion of the C&C strategy to incorporate the responsibilities and
contribution of NEC, as a “corporate citizen” (NEC, 1996a, p. 4).
This expanded orientation of its C&C trategy has resulted in net worldwide sales, as of
March 31, 1996 of $41 billion and capital of $1.8 billion produced by eighty-nine domestic
subsidiaries, thirty-eight overseas consolidated subsidiaries, and 152,719 employees (See TABLE
8 above and NEC, 1996a). Concurrently, NEC has developed a sophisticated organizational
structure to manage and coordinate its diverse entities and activities as well as to constantly
improve quality and lower costs firm wide.
                                         




The origins of the current organizational structure can be traced to the substantial management
reforms introduced by the then “new” President of NEC, Koji Kobayashi, in the mid 1960s.
First, he introduced more integration within each operating division by defining it as ''a single
unit containing all three functions---engineering, manufacturing, and marketing'' (Kobayashi,
1991, p. 17). Second, he introduced the concept of ''zero-defects,'' a practice originated at U.S.
defense related firms like Martin-Marietta and Hughes Aircraft (Kobayashi, 1991, p. 20-21).
Third, he introduced maximum employee involvement in product and process improvement
(Kobayashi, 1991, p. 21-22).
However, as noted above, his most important contribution is the 1977 articulation of the
C&C corporate philosophy, which integrated the computer and communication technologies
with semiconductors. During the last twenty years, the C&C vision has evolved from a
technology-oriented concept to a concept that incorporates the human factor in order to combine
the engineering, manufacturing and marketing divisions to produce and deliver goods with zero-
defects. With respect to the semiconductors, as production approaches the zero-defect level, the
yield is high, and quality is well regarded in the market. This improves the cost and reliability of
the segments using these chips, such as computers and telecommunications, resulting in an
increase in market-share and yields and a decrease in costs for the semiconductor segment.
NEC is organized into five marketing and eleven operating groups (See EXHIBIT 2 in the
Appendix A). All divisions receive professional and technical support from the corporate-staff
group (NEC, 1996a,d). The marketing groups are targeted towards the international and three
domestic markets (NTT, Government and public sector, and Other domestic sales.) The fifth
group coordinates the advertising and promotional activities in these markets. The operating
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groups are targeted towards medium- and long-term R&D,24 development and manufacturing of
specific equipment,25 and special-projects for distinctive marketing and engineering projects as
well as multimedia services.
Within the Semiconductor Group the company's efforts are concentrated in three
dimensions: operational management, development of new technology, and global operation
(See EXHIBIT 3 in the Appendix A). More specifically, the Semiconductor Group is organized
into six divisions: a planning office, information systems center, logistic management center,
quality assurance, and the division which is concerned with R&D, production, marketing, and
sales of semiconductors. The R&D operations in the latter division are distinguished according to
the different types of semiconductors, i.e., discrete, memory, and logic products. With respect to
the marketing and sales division, there are eleven independent subdivisions with offices
throughout the world.26
There is a trade-off between the management principle giving independence to each
operating division, as set by chairman Koji Kobayashi in the mid 1960s, and the need for close
coordination and cooperation of these divisions for efficient decision making. This need for
integration over products and countries demands a unified communications process. For this
reason, NEC Semiconductor Group adapted the English language as a means of communication
among its manufacturing and marketing plants around the world. Thus employees in all levels of
production and management who join the Semiconductor Group are expected either to know
                                         
24 Operating groups focusing on research are R&D, C&C Software, and Production-engineering-development
groups.
25 These operating groups are: C&C product technologies group for communications, factory automation, and
control systems; C&C Systems group for customized solutions; Computer group; Personal C&C group;
Semiconductor group; Electronic component group; and home electronics group.
26 The eleven subdivisions are: Semiconductor Marketing; Semiconductor Solution Engineering; Semiconductor
Sales Engineering; 1st Semiconductor Sales; 2nd Semiconductor Sales; 3rd Semiconductor Sales; C&C
Semiconductor Sales; ULSI Device Development Laboratories; VLSI Manufacturing Engineering; VLSI Packaging
and Testing Engineering; and LSI Manufacturing.
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English, or to master the language within the first year of their employment. Even though this is
quite remarkable in its own right, it is understandable. In an industry characterized by global
competition, rapid technological change, and the need to establish production and marketing
units in different geographic locations, the clear and rapid accumulation and distribution of
information are essential. In addition to its geographic expansion, however, NEC has diversified
in the types of goods it produces. This will be examined next.
4.4 Product range and manufacturing
The semiconductor product portfolio of NEC extends from transistors and diodes to dedicated
and hybrid ICs (See EXHIBIT 1 in the Appendix A). In memories it produces DRAMs, SRAMs,
ECL RAMs, Mask ROMs, and EPROMs while in semi-custom ICs it produces gate-arrays, cell-
based ICs, analog masters, etc. In microcomputers, it produces 4-bit, 8-bit, and 8-16-bit single
chip microcomputers, DTS microcontrollers, V and VR series microcomputers, peripheral LSIs,
etc. The memory, semi-custom IC, and microcomputer high value added categories represent
more than 80% of sales in terms of value. In addition, NEC produces optical devices, microwave
devices, high-frequency consumer devices, and general-purpose linear and digital ICs. About
30% of the total semiconductor production is for internal use, while the remaining 70% is
distributed in the merchant market.
In 1996, eighteen design and manufacturing centers that were located in Japan and
overseas focused on the production of semiconductor devices. Within Japan, manufacturing units
were found in Fukui, Fukuoka, Hiroshima, Kansai, Kumamoto, Kyushu, Oita, Sagamihara,
Tamagawa, Yamagata, and Yamaguchi. Overseas, manufacturing units were located in Ireland,
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the United Kingdom, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and California. The Overseas
Semiconductor Plants Coordination Division oversees these facilities outside Japan.27
The reasons we observe this globalization of the Semiconductor Group are as follows.
First is the need to compete in quite different markets such as the North American and the
European semiconductor markets. Kobayashi (1991, p.179) emphasized this objective by stating:
“Have your production and marketing facilities as close to your market as possible.” Second is
the independence of the different stages of production that allows for such geographic
diversification. As shown earlier, the design of a semiconductor need not be completed in-house,
and similarly, its assembly and final testing do not need to take place in the same location as its
manufacturing. Third, due to the importance of foreign markets, Japanese firms use foreign
direct investment to enter a sector and reduce the effect of changes in the foreign trade policies.
Finally, Japanese firms use offshore production facilities to hedge against exchange rate risks.
For instance, due to the recent appreciation of the Yen, more than half of the Japanese TV and
VCR production is taking place offshore (EIAJ, 1995, p. 3-1).
Generally, NEC and its subsidiaries’ plants are dedicated production facilities. However,
NEC has been able to operate its plants in a “flexible” fashion. While other competitors were
forced to reduce the price of their products in periods of declining demand, NEC was able to
partially offset this effect by redirecting capacity to segments where the decline of the demand
was less severe. Although the technical details are not clear, analysts of the Japanese
semiconductor market believe NEC can more easily adjust its capital and labor force so as to
                                         
27 The LSI design centers outside Japan are Portland, Mountain View, Santa Ana, Dallas, Chicago, Raleigh, Boston,
Milton Keynes, Paris, Eindhoven, Dusseldorf, Stuttgart, Milan, Munich, Stockholm, Singapore, Hong Kong, and
Taipei. See NEC (1996c), p. 13.
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modify the type of device produced.28 For instance, ICE (1997, p. 2-39) reports that due to the
decline in DRAM prices in 1996, NEC altered some DRAM facilities to produce ASICs
(Application Specific ICs) for which the demand was still relatively good. It generally takes
about two months to switch the production of a facility from one device to another. NEC's
objective, however, has been to decrease this time to a month, which gives them comparative
advantage in the marketplace.29
In conclusion, by diversifying its product line and increasing the flexibility of its
production process, NEC is not held hostage to the performance of a single product.
Furthermore, in response to the global nature of the industry, NEC has expanded its locations
worldwide. Thus, by following a typical Japanese marketing strategy of surrounding the
consumer with a large spectrum of products, NEC has established a business relationship with
large buyers across countries and products. The result is a better understanding and improved
projections of market conditions, which allow NEC to adjust production accordingly. The
immediate implication is that in periods of lower demand, instead of decreasing the price to clear
unwanted inventory, NEC can modify its production to both, keep inventories lower, and meet
shifts in demand.
The element that connects all the above strategies and directs them to a successful result
is NEC’s flexible manufacturing system. As noted above, this requires a unified communications
process over products and countries. In terms of human resource communication the choice of
the English language is indisputable. The choice of software for communication and information
systems is based on similar criteria.
                                         
28 I would like to thank Hiroyuki Iba of Nikko Research Center (NRC) who on the morning of July 4, 1997, outlined
the Japanese Semiconductor Industry and NEC's role within it and illustrated the concept of flexible manufacturing.
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5 Using information systems as competitive tool
In the semiconductor industry, software and information systems are used extensively, both in
the manufacturing and marketing of devices. It is not surprising, therefore, that NEC's
management has a clear vision of its software needs and thus a clear strategy for software and
information systems. An important decision in this regard has been whether to adapt
commercially available packages or to develop customized software, as is true among many
Japanese companies (Rapp 1995b).
NEC has resolved this question by employing a combination of customized and packaged
software with and without a customized interface. In making these software decisions, NEC
divides its software and information systems needs into two categories. The first includes the
design of the chip. The second contains the manufacturing, marketing, and sales of the
semiconductor products.
5.1 Chip design
Computer-Aided-Design (CAD) software is used in chip design, which is the most costly and
time-consuming stage of semiconductor development and manufacturing. Chip design is also the
stage at which imaginative and creative elements are introduced in the conception of a device.
This makes the human interface the most important characteristic of such software. Therefore,
CAD is required to minimize costs, increase performance, and support many designers. In
addition, CAD has to allow for integration with the commercial part of the business as well as
NEC's in-house tools. Utilizing an open architecture or open CAD system best satisfies the
required mix of individuality and commonality.
                                                                                                                              
29 The importance of flexible production for NEC was presented to us by Mr. Yoichi Numata, Vice President of
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The computer network for LSI design consists of workstations, network, and personal
computers (PC) hardware platforms. Currently, 85% of the software expenditure is for the
workstation's UNIX based operating system, while 10% goes to software dedicated to networks.
The remaining 5% is to meet PC requirements. The latter are the Windows-NT and OS/2
operating systems. However, despite the low current expenditure on PCs, the intention is to
move exclusively to PCs in the near future.
When choosing chip design programs, the criteria used are technology (that is,
functioning and performance), price, and inter-operability, in that order. This has resulted in
adapting a combination of packaged software that is managed by a customized interface (See
EXHIBIT 4 in Appendix A). NEC develops only 20% of the software used in chip design,
satisfying the remainder of its needs from commercially available packages. NEC realizes that in
terms of chip design, specialized firms have a comparative advantage in developing technically
superior software products in an efficient way. Therefore, NEC develops that part of the software
that serves to tighten the linkage between design and production process. Half of this customized
interface is developed by third parties, while NEC and its subsidiaries develop the remaining half
in equal proportion.
5.2 Production and marketing
The above picture is reversed in the production and marketing aspects of the Semiconductor
Group. Here NEC perceives that tacit knowledge, corporate philosophy, and firm culture have to
be integrated into the information systems. In other words, software packages must reflect and
facilitate NEC's philosophy. Therefore, information systems have to be customized.
                                                                                                                              
NEC, Akihiko Morino, Chief Engineer of the Semiconductor Group of NEC, and Yoshitada Fujinami, Senior
Manager of NEC in our meeting, June 23, 1997 in Tokyo.
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In production and marketing, software must facilitate the managing and sharing of
information. In both cases large data sets need to be stored and processed, so the obvious
software requirements are reliable operation and large storage space. In addition, cost
minimization is achieved by following a strategy where the existing information system is used
to the maximum extent. Currently, this results in 70% mainframe usage while the remaining is
network servers. However, NEC believes that the future is in distributed systems. Therefore, it
estimates that within the next five years about 70% of production and sales software demands
will be satisfied with distributed systems.
The second requirement is associated with the reliability of the software’s operation.
With respect to the production of a device, there are two dimensions of interest: production
control and production operation. The former applies to production planning, purchase orders,
inventory levels, and device shipments. Production operations apply to the automatic line
control. The integration of these activities leads to feedback cycles that increase productivity by
reducing defects, cycle times, inventory levels, and delivery time.
The priorities for choosing software for production and sales are reliability, technological
functions, performance, and price. Given the importance of information systems integration
between the marketing and operating groups, the software needed is internally developed. Thus,
90% of the software is developed by NEC or by NEC affiliates. Of this, 55% is developed by
subsidiaries while 30% is developed by third parties under contract to NEC. Most of the
commercially available packages are database management systems or application software used
in overseas subsidiaries. Commercial software is also used in the production equipment where
the semiconductor equipment manufacturer develops the controlling software. NEC’s proprietary
system links these machines and their programs.
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An important outcome of this computerization and the strategic use of information
systems is increased efficiency, often manifested by a decrease in inventory costs. At the same
time, a new phenomenon has occurred: an increase in in-process inventory. NEC and other
Japanese firms, though, refer to in-process inventory as “buffer stocks.” An increase in in-
process inventory is usually perceived as inefficient, the outcome of a “batch” production system
not yet synchronized.
However, NEC and other leading Japanese firms offe  another explanation based on
arguments about capacity utilization and the limits of the assembly line. Under this view, using
buffer stock shortens the production cycle and increases the accuracy and precision of
information sharing, so equipment can be used more intensively. In addition, there is a reduced
risk of being stuck with large inventories of obsolete devices when demand changes. Thus, this
“controlled production” reduces overall inventories and lowers production costs due to better
factor utilization, allowing NEC to respond more quickly to the industry’s rapid changes in
demand.
Here is how it works. A few years ago, NEC, Toyota and some other leading Japanese
producers began to recognize that their ability to get large productivity gains via improvements
in their lean production systems was being limited by the production line itself. For example, in
auto production, the assembly line moves at a certain speed that is limited by the slowest task
which cannot be improved further, or cannot be coupled with another task at an assembly point.
In semiconductors, the batch size has been limited by the smallest capacity piece of equipment.
As the cost of semiconductor equipment rose, the opportunity cost of this unused capacity
became very expensive. The solution was to break the production line and run each piece of
equipment or assembly segment more fully, even if this meant some increase in buffer stocks or
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in-process inventories. However, controlling this process and the size of the stocks and costs
requires sophisticated information processing. Once in place however, it can be used to order
parts from suppliers etc., thus building on traditional lean production systems.
One particular benefit of this approach to NEC has been the discovery that certain ini ial
aspects of their production process are common to a variety of devices. Thus, by increasing their
buffer stocks at this stage of production, they have more flexibility when demand changes, since
they can switch final production from one device to another in less time. In addition, as
semiconductor demand and prices can change rapidly, their ability to shift production more
quickly than their competitors means they are less likely to experience severe price erosion. In
turn, better margins improve the cash flow available to support R&D, marketing and capital
investment. This was demonstrated in 1995 when NEC was the only large Japanese producer to
avoid a loss due to the reduced demand for DRAMs because of their ability to switch to ASICs,
for which demand was still relatively good. In effect, their improved production flexibility
supports their wide product line through lower costs and better time to market, while their wide
product line supports their improved flexibility through market contact and information flow.
NEC's information system links this controlled process together and makes it possible.
Part of this process was forced by NEC's need to become a global company, since the
semiconductor business (as well as its C&C business) was both global and scale sensitive. As
Mr. Kobayashi [(1991), p. 175] stated:
Becoming a global corporation meant upgrading our technology, streamlining
production, and strengthening our sales techniques through competition with the
leading companies of the world. By honing our skills in the international
marketplace, we learned just what foreign markets wanted and how to reflect
these needs in our overseas business strategy.
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Importantly, honing these skills over time required selecting software packages and developing
appropriate criteria to make these software selection decisions. At NEC, software engineers with
a broad knowledge of the semiconductor business establish these criteria. To find the most
important and efficient criteria however, many face-to-face meetings within the semiconductor
group are conducted, since these decisions affect the entire semiconductor process from
development through sales and service. In addition, the choice of a particular software package
can be assessed only after analyzing carefully the impact it has on the entire process. Indeed, this
clarity of vision appears to be a hallmark of the controlled production paradigm.
At the same time, in evaluating software performance, the characteristics used are not
general but application specific in that they depend on the specific area where the software will
be employed. So with respect to using a particular software package, there is no real evaluation
process for a software package already being used. This is because before adopting the software,
NEC has extensively researched all existing customized and semi-customized packages. Thus
NEC is always sure the best available software package for its needs has been chosen.
Nevertheless, the corporation does constantly examine the software market for future orders,
considering all the above mentioned characteristics during the performance evaluation.
6 Concluding remarks
In contrast with the results of earlier studies, NEC appears to use a software strategy that
combines customized and packaged software. Up until the mid-1990s, most of Japan's major
software users pursued a software policy heavily reliant on customized software. This was due to
an historical legacy based on the multiplicity of mainframe operating systems and the firm's own
development of software reflecting its culture and organization (Rapp, 1995). Indeed, based on
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this fact, it was hypothesized that leading Japanese software users would be marginally better at
adapting and developing their software and information systems so as to capture their tacit
organizational and business advantages.
However, the results of this case study indicate that NEC is in fact developing a more
mixed approach to software selection that incorporates more packaged software.30 NEC can do
this because of its understanding of its business and information support requirements. This
clarity of vision permits NEC to benefit from less expensive packaged software, while enhancing
its tacit and organizational strengths through the development of customized software, when no
suitable package is available. This was clearly outlined in NEC's approach to selecting
production software.
In conclusion, the present study offers three main results. First, both customized and
packaged software is used by NEC. Second, NEC consciously and successfully uses software to
sustain competitive advantage by linking its software strategies directly to its overall
management goals. Finally, a new production practice seems to emerge, the controlled-
production, where the segmentation of the production line and subsequent control of each
segment allows the firm to be more efficient and responsive to changes in the market conditions.
                                         
30 This is also supported by the other Sloan case studies as well.
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Appendix A:
EXHIBIT 1: NEC’s Semiconductor Products
Source: “Software and Information Systems for Semiconductor Business.” Presentation by Mr. Akihiro Morino,
NEC Corporation, June 26, 1997.
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EXHIBIT 2: Organization Chart for NEC
Source: Adapted from NEC (1996a).
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EXHIBIT 3: Organization Chart for the NEC Semiconductor Group
Source: “Software and Information Systems for Semiconductor Business.” Presentation by Mr. Akihiro Morino,
NEC Corporation, June 26, 1997.
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EXHIBIT 4: Open CAD Chip Design System
Source: “Software and Information Systems for Semiconductor Business.” Presentation by Mr. Akihiro Morino,
NEC Corporation, June 26, 1997.
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Appendix B:
SUMMARY ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS FOR NEC
QUESTIONS YES NO NOT
CLEAR
A GENERAL MANAGEMENT AND CORPORATE
STRATEGY
1 Has the firm integrated software into their management
strategy, including using it to institutionalize organizational
strengths and capture tacit knowledge on an iterative basis?
x
2 Has the firm succeeded solely on the basis of its software
strategy?
x
3 Does the firm believe some customized software and its
close organizational integration enables the company to
capture and perpetuate on a more consistent basis certain
tacit knowledge and unique corporate features, i.e. core
competencies, that account for its continued success in the
marketplace with reliability and repetition important
elements in their thinking?
x
4 Is the firm’s software strategy successful because it is a
well managed company that introduces software innovation
when it serves corporate goals for enhancing productivity,
inventory management or customer relations within its
industry?
x
5 Does the firm generally meet established criteria as a
quality organization such as: effective organizational self
assessment, use of project and especially cross functional
teams, improving quality outcomes through reducing
uncertainty, rapidly diffusing learning throughout the
organization including the use of software and information
technology, effective implementation of organizational and
technical change, facilitating change via evolution rather
than revolution or reengineering , emphasizing
participatory management, having process excellence,
using value added analysis, actively doing benchmarking,
constant organizational improvement, commitment to
concrete realistic goals, effectively managing a dynamic




6 Does the firm plan in detail for world class operational
excellence including the contribution of software and
information technology to the allocation of resources?
x
7 Do their planning systems enable management to make
better business, operating and resource allocation
decisions, including those related to software and IT, with a
link to resource valuation techniques?
x
8 Do they focus on a small number of priorities, usually three
or fewer, with a well defined, cascaded system reaching
from the commitment of senior management to the
department level with associated metrics?
x
9 Is the firm a “high performance” workplace for services?x
10 Is there a heavy emphasis on improving process through
using software?
x
B INDUSTRY RELATED QUESTIONS
11 Are industry economics and competitive dynamics an
important strategic driver for the firm and for its use of
software and information technology in that IT has been
adapted to the firm’s particular industry and competitive
situation?
x
12 Do industry paradoxes exi t such as: declining stock prices,
manufacturing improvements that create product




13 Is software a significant and successful input into the firm’s
competitive performance?
x
14 Does the firm explicitly and consciously perceive the
implications of their software strategies and use on their
competitiveness and business success?
x
15 Are there direct links between their software strategies and
overall management goals?
x
16 Do customers, affiliates, competitors, industry analysts,
government officials, industry associations and suppliers
perceive the competitive benefits or impact of the firm’s
use of information technology?
x
17 Has the firm gained first mover advantages through
successfully introducing software related innovations?
x
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D INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY STRATEGY
18 Is firm a sophisticated software user that consciously
designs and implements a software strategy to achieve
competitive advantage?
x
19 Does the firms utilize several types of software input alone
or in combination to achieve competitive advantage?
x
20 Does the firm’s system work to rapidly uncover barriers to
implementation, including using new or improved
software, while generating cross-functional and
hierarchical consensus so measured goals can be achieved?
x
21 Is leadership at different levels actively involved in driving
software planning, assessment and deployment with regular
progress reviews that link plans, goals, benchmarks,
metrics, milestones, resources and responsibilities?
x
22 Does the system allow for flexibility and innovation as well
as change and individual efforts provided they meet goal,
planning and metric criteria?
x
23 Is there a clear vision making project and new product
software selection straightforward and closely related to
strategic goals and processes?
x
24 Does this software strategy involve a conscious and clearly
defined reliance on customized and semi-customized
software in addition to packaged software with specific
criteria and goals for selecting each type, and do they have
ways to measure this so that the firm knows customized
software achieves functional or market gains that justify
the additional expense, including related costs of
integrating customized and non-customized software into a
single information system?
x
25 Does the firm use option valuation methods to manage
uncertain and random outcomes since this appears to be at
the software implementation frontiers even among very
well managed companies?
x
26 Does their strategy include increased use, d velopment
and integration of industry and company specific vertical
application software and embedded software in its
production and delivery processes to improve
competitiveness?
x
27 If the firm has an embedded software strategy, is this
integrated or interactive with their other software and
overall business strategy in ways affecting production,
product design or service that improve quality and costs
long term?
x




29 Does the firm believe large-scale outsourcing by many US
companies assumes those firms’ information systems
development need not be integrated with their business
organization and that they view their information systems
as generic products best developed by outside vendors who
can achieve low cost through economies of scale?
x
30 Do they in turn believe this is a mistake by their
competitors that gives them a long-term and sustainable
competitive advantage over such companies because they
believe outsourcing surrenders a firm’s strategic software
options since systems service companies have an incentive
to develop increasingly standardized products and are one
step removed from the company’s customers and business?
x
31 Has the firm established a software strategy that is open
and interactive with its customers and/or suppliers?
x
32 Has this enabled it to capture information or cost
competitive externalities?
x
E INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY OPERATIONS
33 Do participants own goals and are then committed to
implementation strategies?
x
34 Does the firm embed software into its production and
delivery processes with competitive market implications?
x
35 Is software technology tied to high speed
telecommunications technology, allowing the firm to track,
receive and deliver shipments or services directly or on-
line without further handling or processing?
x
36 Does it manage the potential risks of extensive use of
software or open systems?
x
37 Do they work to ensure consistency and reduce
programming errors?
x
38 Is informal interaction a key aspect of planning and
implementation?
x
39 Is the firm’s system institutionalized and self-reinforcing
with good communication and consensus building while
software and IT play a role, including preventing
retrospective justification or target reduction?
x
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F HUMAN RESOURCE AND ORGANIZATIONAL
ISSUES
40 Does the firm pay close attention to systems training and
organizational integration for all employees, reducing
errors through improved consistency and staffing
efficiencies across the firm since software can confound
even routine operations?
x
41 Does certain software require special HR competencies or
education?
x
42 Does the firm try to change human behavior to use
software?
x
G PARAMETER METRICS (INVENTORY, CYCLE
TIMES, & COST REDUCTION)
43 Are goals or targets tightly linked to regularly reviewed
metrics with inputs coming from all levels that are often
cross-functional affecting large parts of the organization,
e.g. cycle times, on-time delivery, and customer
satisfaction?
x
44 Does the firm have standard agreed ways to explicitly
organize or manage this software selection process?
x
45 Does the firm have agreed ways to measure and evaluate
success in using software to promote business objectives
such as unit cost, inventories, lower receivables, market
share, model development times, or product pipeline?
x
46 Are IT costs balanced against overall long-term
productivity gains?
x
47 Does the firm have methods to ensure increased
customization costs result in lower costs downstream so
that developing and using customized software makes
sense?
x
48 Has the firm created large interactive databases to allow
automatic feedback between stages or players in the
production and delivery process? And are these databases
constantly being refined and updated on an interactive
basis with actual performance results in a real time global
environment? What are the competitive and metric impacts
of this? such as reducing inventory costs and wastage while
improving the quality of customer service?
x
49 Has the firm used software to create beneficial feedback
cycles that increase productivity, reduce cycle times and
defects, and integrate production and delivery processes?
x
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50 Do other firms or analysts have alternative measures of
competitiveness or views on appropriate industry strategy?
x
51 Has the firm achieved better than industry growth, superior
on-time delivery, improved inventory control, reduced
down-time or changeover cycles, reduced product or
process defects, fewer recalls, lower warranty claims, an
improved product development process, and/or any other
definite and measurable progress relative to competitors?
x
52 Do the firm’s metrics go beyond financial to areas like
customer satisfaction, operational performance, and human
resources?
x
53 Does their evaluation system apply to new product
development and significant projects as well as to
continuous operations?
x
H SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
54 Can you summarize a mission statement on the role and
impact of software as a tool of competitive advantage for
these firms in this industry?
x
55 Is it consistent with the strategies identified as successful or
appropriate in the existing competitiveness research from
Sloan’s industry study center?
x
56 Are there important business or IT situations that require
further research?
x
57 Are intellectual property issues important in explaining the
successful and sustainable use of software to achieve
competitive advantage?
x
58 Are beneficial cost impacts generally one important
consequence of a successful software strategy?
x
59 Does this company fit a profile where software seems most
likely to contribute to enhanced competitiveness?
x
60 Based on these studies is the market for vertical application
and embedded software growing?
x
61 Since Japanese competitors normally do not outsource, do
Japanese firms see themselves as benefiting from this US
trend?
x
62 Does this leading Japanese firm assign positive value to
improved integration and enhanced control through
selective customization?
x
63 Do general measures such as increased productivity, as
evidenced by reduced cycle times and lower defect rates,
reflect the benefits of a successful software strategy?
x
64 Are the benefits of a successful software strategy also
reflected in specific industry standards such as an expanded
x
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customer base, or improved yields?
65 Does this leading IT user have explicit criteria for selecting
package versus customized software and for semi-
customizing software packages?
x
66 Does this firm closely integrate or couple its software and
business strategies beyond mere alignment?
x
67 Does this firm closely integrate its organizational and HR
policies with its software systems?
x
68 Has NEC reorganized in order to successfully use software
and information technology?
x
69 Has NEC’s software codified or built on existing
organizational strengths or core competencies including
HR alignment with business and IT strategies?
x
70 Has NEC embraced and integrated information technology
as part of its business strategies and core competencies?
x
71 Is NEC’s MIS department integrated with the rest of the
firm in terms of organization and decision making?
x
